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Introduction 
After almost five years of scrutiny on the 
economic criteria for EU membership of 
Bulgaria, at the eve of the accession the 
monitoring report by the European Commission 
unexpectedly turned its focus on the political 
criteria. 
The objective reasons for that change, that is 
independent of Bulgaria, its government officials 
and citizens, are basically as follows: 
 Weariness of the enlargement and 
concern (especially in France) from the 
fact that the number of beneficiaries of 
subsidies from Brussels will increase, 
together with alienation of the European 
Institutions from the voters and anti-
reform attitude of the political leaders 
from the “old” EU members; 
 Inability of EU to improve on a timely 
basis its mechanisms for political 
unification, economic lagging of EU 
behind the USA, intensive competition 
from new EU members and a global 
pressure to which the Union fails to 
oppose in an inadequate manner; 
 Activity and clear reform-orientated 
attitude of the newly elected members of 
the European Parliament and of Brussels 
administration that comes from the new 
EU members;  
 The resources that will be left if new 
enlargement takes place include costs 
for monitoring of only two, not ten 
candidate countries. 
Of greater importance are the internal reasons 
for this redirection of the attention towards the 
political criteria. Among them, the most 
important ones are: 
 The Bulgarian voters after fifteen-year 
attempts (sometimes going extreme) to 
find something better on the political 
market, sent to the parliament a 
configuration of parties that cannot build 
an effective executive power; 
 The new government was late when it 
began its work, and secondly, began 
kicking up a row and fussing around, 
instead of undertaking elementary 
measures for transparency in order to 
use the social opinion as a correcting 
tool of the internal inefficiency; 
 The views of the leaders are archaic, and 
the moods are pro-reform towards the 
reforms that took place in the period 
1997-2001; archaic – meaning that they 
come form the era of communism, and 
especially archaic in the sphere of 
justice, property rights and 
administrative structure of the country. 
In brief, the government turned out to be a 
problem to itself. 
The current monitoring report by the European 
Commission, as it is already known, is critical 
towards the political criteria for accession and 
Institute for Market Economics, Bulgaria 
Economic Policy Review, issue 39, May 2006 
2
positive to the economic development of 
Bulgaria. Because the economy is, fortunately, 
not under the direct control of the government, 
we can believe that the report is critical to the 
government but highly appreciates the efforts 
made by the Bulgarian citizens and the business 
to cope with the challenges of the accession.  
The commentaries by the officials about the 
report are to a great extent excuses and appeals 
for unification of their own rows instead of 
suggestions of possible solutions to the stated 
problems.  
To some degree, the action plan is already set in 
the report itself. Our notes below aim at assisting 
its reading.  
As a whole, we think that the technical 
requirements will be completed by October but 
no proofs will be presented that the reforms in 
justice and home affairs are fruitful. This means 
that Bulgaria will become a EU member next 
year but most probably with a protection 
mechanism against the ineffectiveness of the 
Bulgarian judicial system. We believe that the 
real concern should address the effective 
protection of the Bulgarian citizens and their 
rights rather than the protection of the citizens of 
other EU members from Bulgarians. But the 
evaluation process is already set in that direction 
and it will be difficult to be redirected.   
Political Criteria 
Justice and Home Affairs 
“The constitutional amendments leave some 
ambiguities regarding the guarantees of the 
independence of the judiciary. Any ambiguity 
must be removed” 
 “Intensified enforcement of anti-money 
laundering provisions (acquis chapter 24)” [is 
needed]. 
 
However, certain outstanding issues remain to 
be addressed. The accountability, transparency 
and efficiency of the justice system need further 
strengthening. 
The above-mentioned misunderstandings are a 
result of the following circumstances: 
1. The Minister of Justice plays active role 
in organization of the activities of the 
Supreme Judicial Council and in the 
formation of the judicial system budget;   
2. The inability of the Council to define its 
own budget, the lack of an internal 
auditing system that helps the budgeting 
process and the lack of criteria for 
evaluation of the effectiveness of people 
that are in charge of it;  
3. Inadequate constitutional amendments – 
the phrases used and the established 
procedures create a suspicion of a 
dependence (the meaning of the words 
used is the same in all languages, 
including Bulgarian); these amendments 
are in opposition of the amendments that 
were made last year in Romania (which 
used to have the same critiques as the 
ones that showed up in March and April 
this year about Bulgaria); 
4. The base of these amendments is the 
reluctance of the government officials to 
change the place of the public 
prosecution in the judicial system, which 
is subject to the executive power; this 
reluctance motivates, at least formally, a 
submission of the whole justice system 
to the executive and legislative power, 
not de facto but in law. 
The joint denominator of all these circumstances 
is very clear: the ruling coalition wants to use 
the system in the current form by its own view. 
The elected prosecutor general, although 
excelling with his professionalism and positive 
characteristics, still has family relations with the 
government body under communism. It is well 
known that “the son is not like his father”, but it 
is also well known, by the EU observers too, that 
no political consensus was sought for the 
position of a prosecutor general.  
This is an expression of arrogance, although 
entirely within the established set of practices. 
This arrogance has already played and will 
continue to play in the future its vital negative 
role during the reformation of the justice system 
in the country. 
 
Organized crime 
As for the so-called organized crime, the report 
in fact says that at present the government only 
demonstrates and boasts. The reply of the 
Bulgarian officials to this critique reveals 
basically two things: 
1. They repeated in the form of self-
criticism the assessment by the EU 
experts but justified themselves by 
saying that the problems have been 
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accumulating for years, “during a period 
of sixteen years”; 
2. The government makes an attempt to 
change its own appearance in front of 
the eyes of the society, but for now there 
is no concrete idea what can and should 
be done as opposition to the organized 
crime as well as about the ambiguity 
concerning the independence of the 
judicial system.  
 
It is obvious that the problems are not from last 
year and they have been accumulating for years. 
But the sources should be sought not in 1990 or 
1991, but many years before that: 
 In appointing of bankers in the 
period of May 1989 – August-
September 1990; 
 In the parallel activities of 
representatives from the organs of 
public order and security business in the 
official environment.  
 In the artificially maintained 
secrecy of the actions of these organs in 
the past and present which is harmful for 
the social confidence in the government, 
and in the process of destruction of 
archives;  
 In the methods of human 
resources management, which have lead 
mainly to incompetence and mediocrity.  
In these circumstances, there is a great 
difference between wishing and capacity. The 
governing coalition expresses its wish. But it 
sees the roots of the problems only in the above-
mentioned span of time, in the democratic rules 
and market reforms, not in the lack of such.  
However, what is going to be done is due to the 
pressure from the Bulgarian and international 
social opinion. This is one of the benefits from 
the experience of Bulgaria to join EU. 
 
Money Laundering  
The non-intensive fight with the “money 
laundering” is maybe the only meaningless 
remark in the report, although it is marked as “a 
sphere of particular concern”. 
First, the legislation system itself in this sphere 
is meaningless. It is based on the conception that 
all transactions and remittances of money over a 
defined sum should be under strict control. This 
leads to the necessity of a costly flow of 
information and reporting that cannot be used 
for the pursued objectives. The Bulgarian organs 
– even being the cleverest ones – cannot do 
anything useful with this database in exactly the 
same way as the EU members cannot.  
Despite this, as it was emphasized by the 
prosecutor general, in this sphere “tangible 
positive results” are most easily tracked.   
 
Fighting Corruption 
“Corruption continues to be a serious challenge 
within the justice system and this may affect the 
smooth and correct implementation of 
instruments in the area of mutual recognition. 
Preparations in this area need to be enhanced.” 
 
The reaction of the Prime Minister with regard 
to this statement was to repeat several times in 
his public speech “we shall” be merciless to any 
form of corruption.   
In a sense, such a behavior and the use of future 
tense is adequate because: 
a) He is supposed to say so; 
b) EU does not have any standards in this 
sphere, and according to external 
sources the country does not stand very 
bad according to this criterion; 
c) He has nothing to do except to repeat 
this statement before the coalition 
partners and ruling bodies.  
There are two main problems that still stand out: 
1. The obvious one is whether the 
politicians will have the courage, 
authority and talent to do what they have 
claimed – since 1999 there were no 
ruling politicians that have been 
expelled from their positions because of 
corruption suspicions; 
2. Then comes the question whether, if this 
is done, the coalition will remain in 
place and whether a potential disruption 
of the coalition will delay the EU 
accession, despite the progress achieved. 
The answer to these questions is not easy, but it 
is clear that doing nothing is a rational strategy. 
The report also states that the capacity should be 
strengthened and a better coordination within the 
Institute for Market Economics, Bulgaria 
Economic Policy Review, issue 39, May 2006 
4
anti-corruption commission should be 
accomplished.  
Our estimates show that through programs of 
European Commission and the US government 
about 30 million euro have been spent for this 
purpose. The result, if any, is rather ambiguous 
by general consent. Most probably, there is 
something wrong in the system. There are some 
problems and system factors which have not 
been included in the report due to the fact that 
EU does not have a common single practice to 
address this issue – and even if it does – there 
are no instruments by which to enforce it: 
 A main problem is financing of the 
political parties and their election 
campaigns and the follow-up 
accountancy, the lack of publicity in this 
sphere leads to a lack of loyalty of all 
governments after elections; 
 Practices exist for lump sums 
government spending such as Highway 
“Trakia” and NPP “Belene” Projects. 
The public procurement procedures are 
illegal, non-transparent and 
uncompetitive – however, the EC is 
silent with regard to this issue; 
 Already two governments have 
deliberately deteriorated the accounting 
practices and have hindered the access 
to information by citizens; some 
ministries have almost classified all 
information concerning programs and 
budget resources, the meetings of the 
members of parliament are not public as 
well. However, none of the EU reports 
by now have paid any attention to this 
“tiny matters”.  
 Bulgaria is the only country in new 
Europe (except Ukraine and Russia, but 
including Albania and Moldova) where 
the members of parliament keep their 
property and the property of the 
executive and judicial power away from 
the eyes of the outside world. 
 
Private bailiffs system 
“Private bailiffs still need to become 
operational”  
 
Despite the passing of the law on private bailiffs 
(2005) and the tariff of charges to private bailiffs 
(2006), the system of private bailiffs could fail 
to become as operational and efficient in the 
near future as the EU officials or we wish to. 
The reasons for this are as follows: 
 The competence status of the private 
bailiffs is limited within specified 
regions. This is wrong because no 
conditions for free competition among 
bailiffs exist and incentives are created 
for private settlements and distribution 
of the market shares on a principle that 
differs from the idea “the client 
chooses”. 
 The system of public bailiffs is still in 
place although it has proved its 
inefficiency through the years. The costs 
for its maintaining will continue to 
burden the budget of the judicial system 
without sufficient results to be 
accomplished.  
 There is a tariff of the charges and fees 
that private bailiffs can get. However, 
the bailiffs are entrepreneurs like all the 
others and they should have the right to 
specify by themselves the prices for the 
services that they provide. 
 
IME has many times proposed and justified the 
necessity of a national-wide competence status 
of the private bailiffs as a factor that stimulates 
competition, and fights against the inefficiency 
of the system of public bailiffs by giving greater 
negotiation power for all sides. 
 
Economic Criteria 
 
Macroeconomic Stability 
“In view of the very high trade and current 
account deficits, the continuation of tight fiscal 
policies and measures to contain credit growth 
as well as moderate wage increases remain 
crucial.”   
The current account deficit is the reason for the 
measures against extensive crediting that the 
Bulgarian National Bank and the government 
undertook. The restrictions by the central bank 
on commercial banks will loose, because the 
potential EU accession of Bulgaria means that 
banks, which are licensed in any country in EU, 
will have right to operate in the country and will 
not be treated with the same measures. 
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The budget surplus means that the government 
will continue to take away more money from the 
citizens than it needs to cover its expenses. Thus, 
it deprives people of the free choice to use and 
direct by themselves the resources they have 
produced. The tax burden hinders the efficiency 
of the economy, the incentives for work and 
entrepreneurship and the stimuli for tax 
avoidance and the operation in the gray 
economy flourish.  
 
Privatization and industrial restructuring  
“Out of a total of more than 5800 enterprises 
with state ownership foreseen for privatisation, 
the state still holds majority or minority stakes 
in 520 enterprises. Stakes in 74 enterprises were 
sold since September 2005, mostly involving 
minority shareholdings, but the share of 
privatized assets increased only slightly and 
remained just below 90% of all assets foreseen 
for privatisation. Of the larger privatisation 
deals mentioned in the 2005 report, only three 
(Boyana film studios, Varna thermal power 
plant and the river shipping company) were 
close to finalisation in April 2006.”  
 
The process of privatization has been 
considerably delayed although privatization 
positively affects the competitiveness of the 
economy. The privatization of some of the state 
companies is even not discussed at all because 
their activities are believed to be an exclusive 
priority of the state. Such an example is 
“Bulgartabac”, which is handled as a policy 
instrument by one of the parties in the ruling 
coalition instead as an operating market subject.    
 
“In the area of administrative cooperation and 
mutual assistance, good progress has been 
made. The National Revenue Agency (NRA) 
became operational in January 2006 upon the 
entry into force of the new Code on tax and 
social security procedures. The NRA brought 
together the collection and servicing of both 
central government taxes (such as VAT and 
corporate taxes) and compulsory social security 
contributions (such as health insurance). The 
ongoing reform of the sector, in particular the 
successful transformation of the tax 
administration into the NRA, has improved the 
collection and control capacity, as shown by the 
increase in total tax collection.”  
It is too early to evaluate the efficiency of the 
newly established National Revenues Agency, 
but we should mention the problems with the 
information system and the additional costs that 
were needed for the start of the agency.  
The greater amount of revenues from taxes 
(including social security payments) cannot be 
attributed only to the new administration 
structure. It is a result of the lowered direct taxes 
and social security rates and the consequential 
reduction of the stimuli for tax evasion.  
 
Labor market flexibility 
“However, certain outstanding issues remain to 
be addressed. Hardly any progress has been 
made on removing labour market rigidities and 
modernising the regulatory framework, in 
particular as regards working time or the use of 
fixed-term contracts. The integration of seniority 
bonuses into the regular pay scale has been 
delayed. “  
 
IME has constantly appealed and publicly 
presented its proposals for the creation of a more 
flexible labor market. In the context of the 
suggestions of EU, the ideas of the social 
minister Mrs. Maslarova for tying the wages in 
the public and private sector with a specific 
formula is a step backwards toward abolition of 
market principles on the labor market. At the 
same time, if the proposals by the labor unions 
are undertaken, a negative assessment will 
follow by the European Commission. The 
flexible labor market is a prerequisite for 
reduction of unemployment, stimulation of labor 
productivity and mobility and more efficient 
utilization of human capital in the economy. 
The above-mentioned obstacles in the report are 
only a small part of all impediments that 
employers and employees face every day. So, 
the following measures should be added:  
 Regulations on working time should be 
abolished – limitation to the working 
time hinders those that want to work 
more, and respectively, to earn more. 
This increases the influence power of 
the labor unions with regard to the terms 
of labor contacts and that is rarely of any 
help for workers; 
 The procedures for hiring and 
dismissing of workers should be 
simplified – thus, the labor market will 
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be more flexible, and more easily 
adaptable to the economic situation 
which allows greater labor mobility; 
 The minimum wage rate and seniority 
bonuses should be abolished – these 
instruments create negative side effects 
for the employers as well as for the 
employees. 
 Social security rates should be reduced 
to 10% (or less) – thus, the labor costs 
for the employers will decrease; the 
incentives for registering the full amount 
of wages will increase; the share of the 
gray economy will fall; 
 A private capital-based pension system 
should be introduced as soon as possible 
instead of the current pay-as-you-go 
system (PAYG) that is prone to default.  
 
“As from January 2006, pension contributions 
were reduced by 6 percentage points and the 
share paid by the employer was reduced from 
70% to 65%, thus reducing non-wage labour 
costs and providing incentives for job creation 
and moving jobs out of the informal sector.” 
 
IME welcomes the reduction of the social 
security rates. For years we have been educating 
the general public and have justified our 
conclusions by quantitative research that this is 
one of the main steps toward higher economic 
growth, prosperity and freer economy. There is 
both a possibility and enough resources for 
notable reduction of social security and tax rates. 
We hope that at the end of the next budgeting 
procedure a further reduction will be set. The 
only matter of concern is the reaction of the 
employers, who could not fully see the benefits 
from the reform for themselves and their 
opposition can cause a problem for 
implementation of further reforms in the future.  
 
“Preparations for an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of active labor market programs 
have started” 
The idea of assessing the efficiency of any 
government program financed with money of all 
taxpayers is excellent.  
The order of the steps, however, should be 
different: let’s assume that there is a problem – 
(1) an investigation of the causes of the problem 
is necessary – (2) Can the problem be solved 
without government intervention? – (3) if no – 
estimation should be made whether the benefits 
for the society exceed the costs for the 
implementation of the proposed program – (4) 
the expected results should evaluated – (5) full 
accountability and transparency of each step 
should be maintained – (6) after a certain period 
a monitoring should be made to assess whether 
the objectives have met or the program proves 
not efficient and should stop.   
Up to present, we have never witnessed such a 
process, but even if one of the steps is 
undertaken, it will be regarded as an 
 achievement by the Bulgarian 
administration. That is why we promote cost-
benefit analysis of the government intervention 
and hope that the conclusions from such an 
analysis will be used to the purpose.    
 
“With regard to social dialogue, the bipartite 
dialogue needs to be further strengthened in 
order to prepare the social partners for their 
future role in the formulation and 
implementation of EU social policy. The 
representativeness criteria have to be applied in 
an impartial way for all social partner 
organisations. Participation in the tripartite 
dialogue needs to be restricted to social partner 
organisations with a social mandate. 
Preparations need to be stepped up.” 
At present, the Ministry Council based on the 
presented documents is verifying the 
representative character of the social partners. It 
will judge whether they meet the legal 
requirements. The problem is that the counting 
of the members is made solely by the 
organizations themselves and as such, the 
membership counting can be biased due to the 
lack of appropriate monitoring.  
According to data from the last available 
membership counting, less than 18% of the 
workers regard themselves as being represented 
by the labor unions. Is this any representation 
power? In April 2006 the Ministry Counsel 
refused to recognize the status of the union 
“Promyana” and now there are only two official 
labor unions. 
 
Agriculture  
Common market organizations (CMOs) 
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“Legislation has been adopted to enforce the 
CMO for milk and measures have been taken to 
put in place the milk quota as well as most of the 
mechanisms for the common market 
organization for milk and milk products. The 
database including the basic quota register has 
been finalized, covering all producers and direct 
sellers; allocation of the indicative individual 
quota is under preparation. The process of 
approval of purchasers is on good track. 
Detailed rules for management of milk quotas 
and of the national reserve have yet to be 
adopted. The national and regional milk boards 
are not fully operational nor are the independent 
laboratories for the analysis of fat content at all 
individual milk factories. The laboratories are 
neither installed nor accredited yet. 
Preparations need to be accelerated.” 
The suggestions by the European Commission 
are rather technical and practical and the 
deadlines can be met if the government 
structures work effectively for this purpose. As a 
result of the introduction of the Common Market 
Organizations several consequences will follow 
on the dairy market. The small-scale and 
inefficient farms, that have been receiving 
subsidies for years, will close because they fail 
to meet the new EU requirements. However, the 
state grants have slowed down the process of 
restructuring in the agricultural sector. The 
initiation of strict quality and hygiene standards 
has necessitated investing in new technologies 
and equipment for those producers that want to 
comply with the new laws. But this was not 
possible for all farmers and as a result, the milk-
processing sector will possibly face shortages of 
fresh cow milk that meet all EU norms. Farmers, 
that have accomplished to meet the standards, 
will win form the accession process due to the 
subsidies and grants they are going to receive 
and the enhanced demand for milk as a result of 
the decline in supply. Registering of the 
producers in special databases will make them 
go out from the gray economy into the official 
sector. 
The possibility of a protective clause in the 
sphere of agriculture will have a direct impact on 
the market because the producers will not get 
free access to the common market and the export 
licenses will remain. At present, the milk-
processing sector is a net exporter in the country 
and it is expected to further increase its export 
power after the accession. There are indications 
for a strong interest from foreign investors in the 
sector of food industry once the business 
environment is equalized by implementing the 
EU requirements.  
Despite the fact that the agricultural sector is 
highly regulated via Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), which leads to market distortions, 
the competition within the union and rivalry 
from the efficient farms in EU will stimulate the 
economic efficiency in the sector and will 
enhance the labor productivity. 
 
Energy 
“Limited progress has been made on 
competitiveness and the internal energy 
market. Increased efforts and swift action are 
now needed in order to complete the opening of 
the electricity and gas markets before accession. 
In the area of nuclear energy and nuclear 
safety, the situation has deteriorated with regard 
to the decommissioning process. Increased 
efforts and swift action are now needed to 
guarantee the irreversible closure of units 1 to 4 
of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant.” 
IME has clearly stated its position against the 
single-buyer model years ago and publicly 
defends the liberalization of the energy market, 
its restructuring and the abolition of government 
monopoly along the energy production chain – 
from production to trading. 
The proposed steps that should be undertaken 
coincide with the prepositions by the EU and 
they are the following:  
 Horizontal unbundling of the activities 
of production, import and export, 
distribution, preservation, delivery, and 
trading of natural gas and electricity; 
 Restructuring of National Electricity 
Company (NEC) and Bulgargaz and 
privatization of the newly established 
companies; 
 Free access for new entrants to the 
market and integration to the common 
European market – giving a competitive 
access to the resources and energy 
infrastructure is vital;  
 Liberalization of the market and market 
establishment of prices of electricity and 
gas: direct negotiations should be 
established between consumers and 
suppliers– traders, distribution 
companies, importers. 
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 Deregulation of the market and where 
possible the sector should be left to the 
free market powers and principles. 
The European Union, however, is silent about 
the grand projects such as NPP “Belene” 
although it is obvious that its realization will be 
irrational and is not based on the principles of 
market economy and free competition.  
 
Industrial policy 
“The privatization and restructuring process 
has continued in Bulgaria, albeit at a slower 
pace than planned. Privatization is almost 
complete but the process has slowed down 
significantly recently with few privatization 
measures actually terminated. The restructuring 
of network industries has continued. The 
privatization process is still not sufficiently 
transparent, and problems with post-
privatization control persist.” 
The privatization of all state companies should 
be a primary objective for the government policy 
– through privatization of all sectors the market 
will be characterized with greater efficiency in 
utilizing the scarce resources in the economy 
and the business environment will be more 
favorable. IME has many times criticized the 
process of privatization and has given concrete 
suggestions for evaluation of the privatization 
procedures and post-privatization monitoring 
system. The highly non-transparent rules are the 
reason for the failure of some privatization 
transactions in recent years: Bulgartabac, 
Bulgaria Air, etc. With the sole exception of a 
privatization type through the stock exchange, 
the access to information concerning the 
privatization of companies is not public – neither 
the privatization contracts, nor the concrete 
procedures and offers are accessible. The 
greatest number of transactions is made via 
negotiations with potential buyers and 
“competitions” which imply corruption practices 
in many cases. 
 
Public Administration 
“The decentralization strategy aiming at further 
decentralizing powers and financial resources 
from the central to regional and municipal level 
has not been adopted. 
Overall, Bulgaria has made good progress in 
the field of public administration and is on the 
way to have an efficient state administration 
provided that the current path of reform is 
maintained.” 
Decentralization is the only way through which 
the municipalities will have incentives and 
authority to be efficient, to compete for business 
and attract investors. In this way the decisions of 
the municipality authorities are transparent and 
the citizens are able to take part in the 
government of the municipality in which they 
live. The process of decentralization supposes 
that the municipalities have the necessary 
resources to make reforms on a regional level.  
Besides fiscal decentralization (taxes collected 
by municipality organs remain in the 
municipality budgets), decentralization is one of 
the main prerequisites for reforms that lead to 
restructuring of the administration in a more 
efficient way: 
 
 Decentralization in education – 
implementation of a voucher system is a 
way through which schools will be able 
to set their own programs and will 
establish a policy for attraction of good 
teachers; parents will have greater 
control on education of their children 
and will take a more active role in the 
process; 
 Decentralization in the healthcare 
system – privatization of hospitals and 
introduction of private healthcare funds 
which will take away the monopoly of 
the National Health Fund and will 
increase the quality of the health 
services;  
 Decentralization in pension system – the 
greatest part of the social security tax (or 
all of it) should be invested in individual 
accounts governed by investment 
managers and funds and thus, greater 
yield and pension assurance is provided 
to employees. This method decentralizes 
the responsibility from the government 
to individuals; 
 Fiscal decentralization and redirecting of 
the responsibilities to municipality 
authorities so that the government 
officials in Sofia can decrease by more 
than 50%.  
 
“The review of regulatory regimes has 
continued, but with limited progress. The newly 
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established Ministry for State Administration 
and Administrative Reform is in charge of co-
ordinating the review and optimization of 
existing regulatory regimes and of giving 
guidance on improving the methodology for 
impact assessments.” 
IME is leading for years a public campaign for 
explaining and implementation of the practice of 
a preliminary regulatory impact studies and cost-
benefit analysis of the laws that have been 
undertaken. In 2003 we made a conception for 
creation of a Better Regulation Unit (BRU) 
whose primary aim is to improve the regulation 
(look here) and for years we have served as an 
independent body and make cost-benefit 
analysis of laws and regulatory norms. 
Unfortunately, we do not believe that the 
Ministry of Economy has the capacity to 
implement and coordinate such an initiative.  
What should be done (and is already a practice 
in many other countries such as Romania, new 
Europe, Russian Federation, Kirgyzstan, etc.) is 
as follows:  
 
a) Introducing legal requirements for 
regulatory impact assessment;  
b) The Prime Minister should coordinate 
the process by requiring that all ministries 
consult RIAs on draft regulations with the 
Unit; 
c) The ideas in the sphere in law making 
should be regarded on the presumption that 
they lack sufficient justification and 
mandatory consultations with NGOs, 
interested parties and the public should be 
enforced.   
d) Questions should be answered 
and analyses prepared at request of the 
general public representatives and 
committees; the access to online database 
with laws published in State Gazette should 
be free to all citizens and easy accessible.  
 
“Measures to optimize the size and structure of 
public administration, to improve training and 
to promote the provision of e-government 
services have been proposed. The new 
Administrative Procedure Code has been 
adopted in March 2006.”  
Measures proposed by the government for 
reduction of the number of administration 
officials by at least 10% is a positive step 
forward. What we notice, however, is a process 
of redistribution of all laid off employees to 
newly established state structures such as the 
ones that have been established by request of the 
EU for acquisition of EU funds. There is no 
clear set of criteria for reappointing of 
employees in the public administration bodies. 
 
Transport Policy 
“Regarding rail transport, the rail operator and 
the infrastructure company continue to make 
losses and to accumulate arrears. Further 
progress in the restructuring of the railway 
sector, including through cost-cutting measures, 
will be essential to improve the financial 
situation.”  
The proposed measures by EC for future reforms 
are not sufficient. Reducing costs is a good idea 
because this means fewer subsidies from the 
budget for covering of losses. However, the 
reduction of costs itself will not lead to better 
services. The only possible way is privatization 
of the Bulgarian State Railways Company and 
giving the railway infrastructure to a 20-year 
concession.  
 
“In the field of air transport, significant efforts 
have been made and most of the relevant 
legislation has been transposed and is generally 
in line with the acquis. Bulgaria has initialed the 
general air transport agreement and the 
European Common Aviation Area Agreement, 
and provisional application of both agreements 
is envisaged as of the day of signature.”  
Joining of Bulgaria to these two agreements is 
essential for liberalization of the market, 
increase in the competitiveness and greater 
benefits for consumers in the form of lower 
prices and greater availability of choice of 
airline companies, destination, etc. 
 
Taxation 
“In the area of VAT, legislation which was 
planned for the end of 2005 has not yet been 
adopted. In the area of direct taxation, the draft 
Corporate and Income Tax Act has not been 
adopted either. Preparations need to be stepped 
up.” 
There are still no proposals for changes in the 
tax system set for public discussion – only ideas 
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are being discussed and there is no clarity what 
should be the official framework of the new tax 
proposals. What we have always defended and 
will repeat again is summarized below: 
- There is a real possibility for reducing of 
revenue tax rates although at present the 
tax rate in Bulgaria is among the lowest 
ones in Europe.  
- It is necessary and possible having in 
mind the balance of the state budget the 
income taxes to be reduced – a lower 
and flat rate will lessen the tax 
administration and will improve the 
revenues of the government budget. 
-  The tax procedures should be simplified 
and the administration - reduced as a 
result. 
The commentaries by the European Commission 
are still aside from two main problems – one is 
internal Bulgarian, the other – common 
European. 
The internal problem is the fact that the 
Bulgarian government for years now has been 
collecting more revenues from taxes than it 
actually needs to cover its expenses. This is a 
source of temptation for breaking the financial 
discipline. IMF insists on having planned budget 
surpluses as a guarantee against loose 
government spending but it fails to say that the 
surpluses can be accomplished by lowering of 
government costs. For the government, the costs 
are “a sacred cow” that should not be touched 
and although it says that the fiscal policy should 
be prudent, the politicians in rule think of 
anything but how to increase government 
expenses. 
The common European problem is a little bit 
easier to explain but difficult to solve. The union 
does not allow for a competition among 
jurisdictions in the sphere of indirect taxes. At 
the same time, there is commitment to a high 
level of redistribution through the EU budget 
and grants. This makes a necessity of 
maintaining a high level of indirect taxes on the 
territory of EU, which compared to other 
jurisdictions, is higher and as a result – an 
arbitrage possibility is created which leads to 
smuggling and “organized crime”. 
The second problem is a source of problems for 
Bulgaria and all other EU members. 
 
 
 
 
Foreign Direct Investment In Post-
Totalitarian Bulgaria  
Nikolay Gertchev1 
(The author is Ph.D. student in economics and teaching 
assistant at the University of Paris II Panthéon-Assas, Paris, 
France.) 
 
The purpose of this note is to examine the 
evolution of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 
the Bulgarian economy since the dismantlement of 
the totalitarian communist State. With the 
recognition and protection of private property that 
one could expect to result from this change of 
political regime, investments from abroad should 
have quickly become a reality. The fact, however, 
is that FDIs in Bulgaria began to expand only in 
the late 1990s, i.e. almost a decade after the 
disappearance of the totalitarian State. On the 
                                                 
1 I wish to thank Georgi Angelov for his careful comments, 
which helped me to correct a few inaccuracies. 
other hand, their progression has been remarkable 
since they began to grow. The average FDI flows 
for the period 1997-2004 amounted for 42 % of 
the gross fixed capital formation, which is by far 
the highest ratio of the whole CEE region 
(UNCTAD 2006a, 2006b). The following two 
tables illustrate this recent tendency and provide 
some additional information as to the allocation 
and origin of FDIs. 
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Table 1. FDI in Bulgaria by host industry (stocks in million euros) 
Industry 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004* 2005* 
Total 2173,8 2900,9 3323,6 3902,3 4946,2 6768,7 8530,7
Transport, storage and communication 261,8 215,4 264,3 469,0 569,7 1207,5 2229,3
Manufacturing 1049,7 1227,4 1454,7 1481,9 1754,0 1900,2 1747,0
Financial intermediation 212,6 530,6 508,1 662,2 925,5 1351,6 1744,0
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles, motorcycles and personal and 
household goods 216,1 435,0 582,9 633,6 871,5 1203,8 1093,2
Real estate, renting and business activities 104,8 202,4 196,5 251,1 416,2 531,4 769,5
Construction 41,8 78,7 82,9 104,3 75,9 164,2 279,3
Non-classified 46,0 26,1 26,4 2,6 26,5 83,4 271,0
Hotels and restaurants 32,1 57,3 62,6 78,2 84,9 108,3 141,7
Mining and quarrying 29,5 25,4 33,3 27,6 51,3 65,7 91,2
Other community, social and personal service 
activities 9,5 16,3 22,6 39,4 55,1 54,0 66,8
Electricity, gas and water supply 162,4 67,7 71,0 133,5 73,7 47,3 64,6
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 5,3 16,6 16,6 17,2 40,7 46,3 29,5
Fishing 0,7 1,0 0,2 0,3 0,3 2,9 3,0
Education 0,2 0,3 0,8 0,5 0,2 0,7 0,7
Health and social work 1,4 0,7 0,7 0,9 0,7 1,5 -0,1
* 2004 data are revised as of April 4, 2005. Preliminary 2005 data. Source: BNB (2006b). 
 
Table 2. Top 20 FDIs in Bulgaria by their nationality (stocks in million euros) 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004* 2005* 
Total 2173,8 2900,9 3323,6 3902,3 4946,2 6768,7 8530,7
Austria 122,2 203,8 297,7 579,5 671,1 1235,1 2415,6
Greece 95,7 233,4 273,4 472,4 532,6 635,3 863,7
Cyprus 209,1 290,9 289,7 357,6 433,5 473,3 529,9
Germany 419,4 353,8 326,0 438,0 428,9 520,5 522,0
Italy 37,2 314,7 308,0 329,4 412,4 482,3 515,9
USA 260,0 281,2 320,4 332,4 363,0 451,2 496,3
Belgium and Luxembourg 135,1 149,4 292,2 220,3 250,9 460,0 457,1
Netherlands 79,9 205,4 315,1 176,3 466,5 625,8 415,1
Great Britain 239,2 220,4 238,5 225,7 292,6 344,1 379,4
Hungary 8,2 6,4 8,9 18,3 178,1 250,6 343,6
France 59,7 101,6 114,9 134,5 135,7 185,4 184,4
British Virgin Islands -0,9 21,7 25,6 94,3 62,6 125,1 181,1
Switzerland 76,6 95,3 103,1 107,5 194,4 298,1 135,4
Turkey 41,4 57,7 49,6 91,4 71,7 98,0 114,4
Ireland 4,9 11,9 3,7 1,0 2,4 18,6 94,1
Denmark 1,3 2,6 2,6 15,6 44,2 41,1 71,5
Liechtenstein 8,9 15,6 25,2 27,8 39,1 62,6 66,6
Russia 145,5 33,2 37,9 31,3 49,4 49,4 57,7
Canada 0,9 2,0 2,2 1,7 8,7 32,6 46,2
Spain 57,2 2,0 7,0 6,7 10,5 17,4 41,2
* 2004 data are revised as of April 4, 2005. Preliminary 2005 data. Source: BNB (2006b). 
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This particularity in the evolution of FDIs in 
Bulgaria since 1990 requires an explanation. In 
the first place, it is highly unlikely that only 
FDIs underwent such a two-stage development. 
Consequently, we begin our analysis by an 
overview of the general macroeconomic changes 
in the Bulgarian economy. The domestic 
macroeconomic situation should not however be 
taken as an immediate determinant of FDIs. As a 
matter of fact, macroeconomic data is produced 
by individuals acting within a given environment 
that itself is subject to change. In order to better 
understand the context within which FDIs are 
carried out, we will consecrate our second 
section to a more detailed survey of the 
microeconomic environment in Bulgaria. Only 
then will we be able to assess wholly, in our 
third section, the economic and legal aspects of 
FDIs in Bulgaria. We will conclude this note 
with some policy suggestions, and an attempt to 
qualify the height of FDIs in Bulgaria. 
 
I. Bulgaria’s Macroeconomic Background 
 
Bulgaria’s economic progress since the end of 
the totalitarian communist regime is clearly 
marked by two distinct periods. The first period 
goes from 1990 to 1997. Even though the 
privatization process has already started in 1992, 
it has been very slow, and by the end of 1996 it 
accounted for the transfer to private owners of 
only 10,84 % of the State-controlled assets 
subject to privatization.2 In the context of a 
politically unstable climate, the socialist 
government rule (1993-1997) brought about 
substantial budget deficits, and announced a 
suspension on the payment of the State’s debt to 
foreign creditors. It has been chosen to solve the 
financial difficulties through inflation. Thus, in 
1996-1997, Bulgarians experienced their first 
hyperinflation in modern post-totalitarian 
history. Subsequent bank runs and the 
dollarization of the economy led one third of the 
banks to publicly avow their bankruptcy. Real 
GDP per capita reached its pre-1990 level. 
 
                                                 
2 For these and any other data about the privatization in 
Bulgaria, cf. Privatization Agency (2006) as well as 
http://www.priv.government.bg/apnew/Root/index.php?ma
gic=0.62.0.0.2. State-owned assets subject to privatization 
exclude infrastructure assets from the total possessed by the 
State. 
The government that took power in 1997 
oriented its efforts towards stabilization of the 
economy and creation of the conditions for the 
missed economic growth. Fiscal discipline was 
secured through the implementation of a 
currency board agreement, still in force today, 
that transformed the national currency, the lev, 
into a simple multiple, initially of the Deutsche 
Mark, currently of the euro (1, 95583 leva 
represent 1 euro). Strict regulation of the bank 
sector was introduced. This monetary reform 
naturally solved the problem of hyperinflation, 
but did not eliminate inflation itself, given the 
nature of the present-day media of exchange 
used in the world. In particular, from 1998 to 
2005, the average annual growth rate of the 
quantity of media of exchange in the Bulgarian 
economy was 16,5 %. This steady increase in the 
quantity of money translated itself into a steady, 
even though relatively slower, erosion of 
money’s purchasing power. Monetary prices of 
consumers’ goods in the Bulgarian economy 
increased in average by 7,15 % per year over the 
period 1998-2005. 
 
The most important reform that was achieved 
was related, however, to privatization. The new 
anti-communist government (1997-2001) 
privatized 66,96 % of the state-owned assets 
subject to privatization. The government that 
succeeded in 2001, and ruled until 2005 (the 
Tsarist government, so to speak), followed the 
same policy, even though at a substantially 
slower rate. Only 9,2 % of the state-owned 
assets subject to privatization were ceded to 
private owners. Up to day, 89,39 % of the state-
controlled non-current assets subject to 
privatization have been transferred to the private 
sector of the economy. Or to put it differently, 
“The total amount of non-current assets 
privatized amounts to 59,03 % compared to the 
amount of all state-owned assets” (Privatization 
Agency 2006a). Despite this relatively slow 
speed of reducing State property, shown in Table 
3, economic growth did appear. In average, real 
GDP grew by 4,5% per year since 1998. By the 
end of 2005, the GDP per capita reached 2771 
euros per year. 
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Table 3. Percent of privatized assets in the total 
amount of the state-owned assets 
  Privatisation 
Agency3 
All State 
Bodies 
Center for 
Mass 
Privatization TOTAL 
1993 0.32% 0.37%   0.37% 
1994 1.47% 1.63%   1.63% 
1995 0.50% 1.07%   1.07% 
1996 3.53% 4.09%   4.09% 
1997 2.38% 3.78% 14.58% 18.36% 
1998 1.76% 4.47%   4.47% 
1999 13.99% 16.96%   16.96% 
2000 2.32% 4.43%   4.43% 
2001 0.60% 0.97%   0.97% 
2002 0.99% 1.16%   1.16% 
2003 1.36% 1.36%   1.36% 
2004 2,58% 2,58%   2,58% 
2005 1,51% 1,51%   1,51% 
2006 0,06% 0,06%   0,06% 
TOTAL 33,38% 44,45% 14,58% 59,03% 
Source: Privatization Agency (2006b). 
 
If most macroeconomic indicators were 
unsatisfactory until 1997, they are all improving, 
even though slowly and not always constantly, 
since 1998. Thus, unemployment increased until 
2001, when it reached 17,3 % of the active 
population, but it has been decreasing since 
(10,7 % at the end of 2005). Average wages and 
salaries are increasing, but at the end of 2005 
they remained still at the low level of 163,4 
euros per month. The openness of the economy 
remained relatively constant during the period, 
with imports culminating at 64,5 % of GDP and 
exports reaching 44,1 % of DGP at the end of 
2005. Gross capital formation is continuously 
increasing. From 9,4 % of GDP in 1993, it 
reached 15, 1% of GDP in 1998, and attained an 
average of 23 % of GDP for the last 5 years. The 
very structure of the economy, estimated by the 
distribution of the gross added value into 
agricultural, industrial and tertiary components, 
undergone significant changes. In 1998, 
agriculture accounted for 26,2 % of the total 
added value, industry for 27,9 % and services for 
45,9 % respectively. In terms of property, 56,7% 
of the GDP was generated by the private sector. 
In 2005, agriculture accounted for 9,3 % of the 
                                                 
3 The Privatization Agency to which the Privatization and 
Post-Privatization Control Agency succeeded in 2002 was 
in charge of organizing the privatization of the big assets. 
Small assets were privatized by the ministries that 
controlled them. Since 2002, all assets are privatized by the 
new Agency. 
gross added value, industry for 30,4 %, and 
services for 60,3 %. The private contribution to 
GDP rose to 68,2% of the total.4 While the 
contribution of the industrial sector remained 
relatively stable, the tertiary increased 
significantly at the expense of the agriculture.5 
Considering the public sector, total tax revenues 
of the State remained relatively constant at a 
level around 30 % of GDP. However, tax 
revenues do present a tendency for increasing 
during the last 5 years, reaching 34,5 % of GDP 
at the end of 2005. Total government expenses 
remain relatively constant at the level of 40 % of 
GDP, of which non-interest expenses constitute 
the most significant, and slowly increasing, part, 
reaching 38,1 % of GDP. Owe to the importance 
of non-tax revenues and grants (8,4 % of GDP), 
the overall budget is well balanced, and presents 
even a surplus of 3,2 % of GDP for 2005. 
Government debt has been significantly 
decreasing since 2001, when it was 69,9 % of 
GDP. It went down to 31,9 % of GDP by the end 
of 2005. This decrease is mostly due to a 
reduction of the external debt of the public 
sector. However, the gross external debt of the 
country increased during the last five years 
because of an offsetting, and more important, 
tendency with regards to the evolution of the 
gross external debt of the private sector. 
Having reviewed the current macroeconomic 
situation in Bulgaria and its recent evolution, let 
us now examine more specifically the general 
business environment and in particular the way 
it is being affected by Bulgaria’s modern State. 
II. Business Environment And Government 
Intervention 
Economic activity and perception of revenue on 
the territory of Bulgaria is subject to regulation 
                                                 
4 For the data on the distribution of the GDP, cf. National 
Statistical Institute (2006a). 
5 If analyzed in terms of employment, the tendency of a 
decrease of the public sector has to be qualified. In 2001, 
779 384 of all 1 889 874 employed in the economy, i.e. 
41,23%, were employed by the public sector. In 2004, this 
percentage fell down to 33,87% of all 2 152 301 employed. 
In nominal terms, all employed by the public sector did 
decrease by 50 491. However, the size of the public 
administration increased during the same period by 22 843 
administrative workers, i.e. by 23,83 % (idem., 2006b). It 
must therefore be concluded that the tendency of a decrease 
in public property goes hand in hand with the consolidation 
of Bulgaria’s modern democratic State. We therefore 
observe the transition from a collectivist State engaged 
mainly in the monopolistic production of economic goods 
into a democratic state engaged mainly in expropriation and 
redistribution. 
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and taxation by the Bulgarian government. 
Value-added tax is currently established at 20 
percent.6 Corporate income tax has fallen from 
23,5 % in 2003, to 19,5 % in 2004 to 15 % in 
2005 (lower than in Romania, but still higher 
than the 9 % in Montenegro). Personal income 
tax is collected on an annual base, according to a 
progressive scale, the first 90 euros per month 
being free from taxation. Marginal rates of 
taxation are of three levels, 20%, 22% and 24 % 
(down from 29 % in 2004), the latter being the 
highest. Even though taxation of the product of 
labor seems relatively low, social security 
payments are an additional means of 
confiscation of private income to be taken into 
consideration. Social security costs to the 
account of the employer amount to 23,6 to 24,3 
% of the monthly salary, to which one has to add 
12,3 % that are imposed on the employee. 
Despite the high cost of the fiat social security 
system, labor costs in Bulgaria were the lowest 
in the region by the end of 2005, namely 1,1 
USD/hour (1,4 USD/hour in Romania, 2,4 
USD/hours in Turkey, 13,7 USD/hour in Greece, 
with an average in the European Union of 28,3 
USD/hour). 
Exchanges of goods and services between 
Bulgarians and foreigners were subject to an 
average tariff rate of around 1% in 2004, 
remaining therefore relatively stable in 
comparison to the 1,5 % in 2002. However, 
additional difficulties for foreign trade arise 
from non-tariff barriers that the US Department 
of Commerce identifies as “excessive 
documentation requirements, slow processing of 
shipments, and corruption” (Heritage 
Foundation, 2006, p.1). 
Labor legislation stipulates an 8-hour working 
day, with a 24-hour rest period required during a 
7-day period. A minimum monthly gross salary 
of 82 euros is imposed. Termination of labor 
contracts of employees other than senior 
managers requires a sufficient justification. 
Notice periods are usually 30 days. Legally fixed 
compensations in case of termination of the 
labor contract based on “mutual consent” must 
not be lower than 4 monthly gross salaries. Upon 
dismissal due to staff reduction, closing-down of 
a productive facility, reduction of the volume of 
work or work interruption for more than 15 
working days, unemployment compensations 
paid by the former employer amount to 1 
                                                 
6 All data herein quoted come from InvestBulgaria Agency 
(2006a, pp. 4-16). 
monthly gross salary. Employment of foreign 
persons requires a permit. A temporary work 
permit is valid one year, and can be renewed 
twice. All foreign persons that have a permanent 
residence permit can be employed in the same 
way as Bulgarian citizens. The total of 
employees who are foreign citizens cannot 
exceed 10 % of the total workforce, however. 
All employers must register a new labor contract 
with the National Agency of Revenues within 
three days of its conclusion.   
Human capital quality is very positively assessed 
by analysts. The education is estimated to be 
among Europe top 5 %. 7 % of the workforce 
has engineering degrees. English language is 
studied by 70 % of students. Post-totalitarian 
emigration, even though expatriates are typically 
of the age of the active population, is considered 
to have a negligible effect on the potential for 
development of the economy (Gächter 2002) 
Registration of companies in Bulgaria is 
relatively easy. For example, registration of a 
limited liability company requires the 
presentation of 11 documents to the Commercial 
Register of the local District Court, takes one to 
two weeks, and costs around 125 euros. 
Registration of trade representative office of a 
foreign person requires producing 8 documents, 
takes 3 days and costs 100 USD. However, 
starting real economic activity is significantly 
more cumbersome. Various certificates are 
required, and the administrative agents supposed 
to furnish them seem to be of a very low 
efficiency, unless incited by non-legally required 
financial means. The US Department of 
Commerce characterizes the situation in the 
following terms: “An abundance of licensing 
and regulatory regimes, their sometimes 
arbitrary interpretation and enforcement by the 
bureaucracy, and the incentives thus created for 
corruption, have long been seen as an 
impediment to investment” (ibid., p.2). 
Infrastructures in Bulgaria are relatively poor. 
Roads, state-owned, are in a bad shape, and the 
percent of highways comparatively to the total 
length of roads is negligible. The first end-to-end 
highway to connect the capital city of Sofia to 
the Black Sea coast is to be built by 2009. 
Financed by a 35-year concession to a 
consortium between Portuguese firms (51 %) 
and the Bulgarian government (49 %), the 
project does not seem to have begun yet. 
Railways, all of which are state-owned, are old, 
slow, and of low efficiency too. There are a 
significant number of airports. Airport traffic of 
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passengers grows by roughly 20 % per year, 
reaching 1 605 000 passengers in 2004 for the 
airport of Sofia, and 1 334 000 and 1 353 000 
passengers for the airports of Varna and Bourgas 
respectively (the two biggest coastal cities). 
It appears from our survey of the microeconomic 
conditions in Bulgaria, that the fiscal burden on 
enterprises is relatively low, and has been 
decreasing in recent years, in comparison to 
taxation in other European countries. On the 
other hand, however, general conditions for 
doing business are spoiled by a high degree of 
administrative regulation that goes hand in hand 
with corruption and low efficiency of the 
infrastructure. Let us now try to describe and 
explain, within that context, the evolution of 
FDIs in Bulgaria. 
III. Foreign Direct Investment: 
Economic And Legal Aspects 
Foreign direct investment in Bulgaria is of 
two types due to the particular structure of 
ownership in the country at the end of the 
totalitarian regime. The first type, which 
could be called FDI from privatization, 
consists in the acquisition by foreigners of 
state-owned property. The second type, 
which could be called Greenfield FDI or FDI 
from expansion, consists in the acquisition of 
property that has already been private and/or 
in expanding an existent private property. 
The following table gives an idea of the 
extent of both types of FDI. 
 
Table 4. Flows of FDI in Bulgaria, 1992-2004 (in million US dollars) 
Year 
 
(1) 
Greenfield and 
Expansion FDI 
(2) 
FDI from 
Privatization
(3) 
Total FDI
(4) 
GDP 
 
(5) 
G and E FDI 
/GDP 
(2)/(5) 
Total FDI 
/GDP 
(4)/(5) 
1992 34,4  34,4 8605 0,40% 0,40%
1993 80,4 22 102,4 10812 0,74% 0,95%
1994 76,7 134,2 210,9 9484 0,81% 2,22%
1995 136,6 26 162,6 13055 1,05% 1,25%
1996 180 76,4 256,4 10368 1,74% 2,47%
1997 214,8 421,4 636,2 10198 2,11% 6,24%
1998 404,4 215,6 620 12735 3,18% 4,87%
1999 592,1 226,7 818,8 12946 4,57% 6,32%
2000 635,5 366 1001,5 12597 5,04% 7,95%
2001 793,7 19,2 812,9 13599 5,84% 5,98%
2002 839,7 130 969,7 15651 5,37% 6,20%
2003 1732,8 364,1 2096,9 19860 8,72% 10,56%
2004 1667,3 1216 2883,3 24131 6,91% 11,95%
Source: InvestBulgaria Agency (2006d). 
 
The table suggests that FDI from privatization 
was not the most important type of FDI, except 
for 2004, when the big national 
telecommunications company and most of the 
electric distribution plants were sold by the 
government to foreigners. We have also to note 
that the dynamics of this type of FDI is mostly 
determined by the State’s discretionary decision 
to sell parts of its property or not. In this respect, 
table 4 shows how much unstable politicians’ 
behavior may be. On the other hand, FDI from 
privatization is doomed to disappear once the 
privatization process has been completed. 
Finally, this type of FDI does not consist into an 
increase of net investments in the Bulgarian 
economy, but only into a transfer of an already 
existent property. This implies that FDIs from 
privatization are not a net investment at all.7 
Therefore, an economic analysis that aspires to 
explain the evolution of FDIs and their overall 
effect on the economy should concentrate on 
greenfield and expansion FDIs only. Legally, 
however, FDIs from privatization have to 
comply, in addition to other laws, with the 
                                                 
7 We do not affirm here that this transfer of existing 
property does not increase efficiency of property 
management. However, we do want to stress upon the fact 
that these two issues have to be examined independent from 
one another. 
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Privatization and Post-Privatization Control Act, 
first voted in 2002, and last amended in 2005.8 
Focusing our attention on the Greenfield and 
Expansion FDIs, we can notice that this type of 
FDI shows a steady increase, unless maybe for 
2004, in nominal terms as well as comparatively 
to GDP. Here again, two periods must be 
distinguished, namely before 1997, and after 
1997. As a matter of fact, the Encouragement of 
Investment Act was adopted at this time, and it 
is perfectly understandable that FDIs increased 
after the adoption of this new piece of 
legislation. Also, since the implementation of the 
currency board, all restrictions on imports and 
exports of capital were abrogated. Thus, a 
favorable environment for investments was 
created, and we should now analyze it in more 
details, especially from a legalistic standpoint. 
The most essential legal fact that has to be 
mentioned first is that Bulgarian law does not 
differentiate between investments made by 
residents and investments made be foreigners. 
This is one of the central provisions of the 1997 
Act.9 The legislation on investments, therefore, 
does not discriminate at all against foreigners. 
Investment projects, which shall all be realized 
within three years and create new jobs in order 
to be considered eligible for encouragement by 
the government (InvestBulgaria Agency, 2006b, 
art.12), fall into three classes: first class for 
investments over 70 million leva, second class 
for investments from 40 to 70 million leva, and 
third class for investments from 10 to 40 million 
leva (idem., 2006c, art.2). In addition, the 
Encouragement of Investment Act provides a 
certain number of real incentives that vary 
according to the size of the investment. First, an 
InvestBulgaria Agency is created, whose role is 
to facilitate the implementation of the 
investment project. For third-class projects, the 
Agency provides pre-developed information 
materials, information about potential partners in 
the country, and information about all the 
administrative procedures. For second-class 
projects, the Agency offers also individual 
administrative servicing with respect to all 
central and regional bodies of the Executive. 
First-class projects benefit, in addition, from 
                                                 
8 This Act replaced the original law on privatization, first 
voted in 1992. 
9 One may even suggest that the absence of discrimination 
toward foreigners is already solidly grounded in the 
Bulgarian Constitution: “The investments and economic 
activity of Bulgarian and foreign citizens and legal persons 
shall enjoy the protection of the law” (Bulgarian 
Parliament, 2006, art.19(3)). 
individual information and administrative 
services, as well as from assistance with real-
estate “titling” issues. Also, they may require 
infrastructure building support from the 
government (idem., 2006b, art.12). 
In addition, the Encouragement of Investment 
Act provides significant tax incentives. 
Investment projects in the manufacturing 
industry in regions of high unemployment 
benefit from complete corporate tax exemption, 
even though some additional conditions have to 
be met.10 Thus, all business sites and premises of 
the taxpayer have to be located in the respective 
high unemployment region. The tax exemption 
takes the form of a tax credit that has to be 
reinvested in the company. The investor is also 
obliged to make an additional investment that 
amounts to at least 25 % of the tax credit. The 
assets thereby acquired could not be disposed of 
within 5 years, unless in cases of mergers and 
reorganization. Another complete tax exemption 
of VAT is granted for the import of goods 
necessary for completion of the investment 
project. Finally, the corporate tax base is 
reduced  by the amount of expenditures made for 
research and development in cooperation with 
research institutes and/or universities. 
Notwithstanding taxation of income, foreign 
property in Bulgaria is generally well-protected 
by the law. Bulgaria’s post-totalitarian State, in 
its foundational document, acknowledges that 
“Private property shall be inviolable” (Bulgarian 
Parliament 2006, art.17(3)). However, private 
property may be violated and encroached by the 
government if there is no other way to satisfy 
important State and municipal needs: “Property 
may be taken by eminent domain for state and 
municipal needs solely in pursuance of a law 
subject to the condition that these needs cannot 
be satisfied in another manner and after an 
advance and equivalent compensation” (ibid., art 
17(5)). It must be added here that foreigners are 
prohibited from acquiring and owning land, even 
though this prohibition will disappear soon, with 
Bulgaria’s expected accession to the European 
Union (ibid., art 22(1)). In any case, this 
provision has not been a real obstacle to foreign 
investors, provided that they can acquire 
property on the account of a moral person 
registered in Bulgaria. An important provision of 
the Encouragement of Investment Act is that if 
an international agreement stipulates more 
                                                 
10 The list of the high unemployment regions is annually 
approved by the Minister of Finance. 
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favorable conditions for foreigners than the 
domestic legislation, then the most advantageous 
conditions should apply: “If an international 
agreement, party to which is the Republic of 
Bulgaria, stipulates more favorable conditions 
for carrying out economic activity by foreigners 
the more favorable conditions shall apply 
according to the international agreement“ 
(InvestBulgaria Agency 2006b, art.3).11 
Concerning international treaties, the Bulgarian 
government has signed the convention for the 
establishment of the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA) as well as of the 
International Center for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID). As of June 2005, 
Bulgaria had already signed 62 BITs (Bilateral 
investment treaties), of which 56 were in force 
by April 2006. In that direction, the continuous 
tendency for the Bulgarian government in recent 
years has been to engage in an increasing 
number of BITs. In 2000, Bulgaria already 
ranked 15th among the top 30 countries in terms 
of BITs concluded (UNCTAD 2000, p. 18). In 
addition, 58 double taxation prevention treaties 
are in operation (InvestBulgaria Agency 2006a, 
p. 4), and discussions for a treaty on double 
taxation with the US government are in 
progress.12 
It can be concluded that FDIs are well protected 
in Bulgaria, and that the Bulgarian government 
shows a stable and positive attitude towards the 
protection of foreigners’ property rights. This, 
together with a relatively attractive taxation, is 
certainly an important factor explaining the 
progress and the very high levels of FDIs in 
Bulgaria. The correct attitude of the Bulgarian 
government towards foreigners’ property and the 
satisfactory legal protection FDIs enjoy in 
Bulgaria are illustrated by the fact that only one 
international dispute opposes currently the 
Bulgarian government to a foreign investor at 
the ICSID.13 
                                                 
11 Once again, one can see here the strict application of a 
provision contained already in the Constitution: “Any 
international treaty, which has been ratified according to a 
procedure established by the Constitution, which has been 
promulgated, and which has entered into force for the 
Republic of Bulgaria, shall be part of the domestic law of 
the land. Any such treaty shall take priority over any 
conflicting standards of domestic legislation” (ibid., 
art.5(4)). 
12 The only impediment to the treaty seems to be the US 
government’s reluctance to make a concession concerning 
its strong desire to obtain a change in the Bulgarian law that 
would allow to investigate bank accounts without a prior 
decision by a court of law (AmCham in Bulgaria 2006). 
13 The case, opposing Plama Consortium Limited to the 
The very satisfactory legal aspects of investing 
in Bulgaria since the 1997 Act clearly explain 
the significant amounts of FDIs in that country. 
It would be quite impossible and rather awkward 
to conclude this very empirical note by a resume 
of its content. Instead, it would be more suitable 
to close it with a final section that suggests some 
policy measures for making investment 
conditions still more attractive. It would also be 
the right place to position FDIs within some 
other important international flows between 
residents in Bulgaria and non-residents. 
IV. Conclusion: Policy Measures And 
Quasi-FDIs 
Provided that there is a clear link established 
between FDIs and their protection against any 
form of expropriation, only one policy measure 
could be suggested: abolish any impediment to 
start quickly business and abolish any 
confiscation, in monetary or regulatory form, of 
the investment results. The Bulgarian 
government has done a lot in this direction in 
terms of tax reduction and tax exemptions. Our 
policy conclusion is that this effort should be 
continued, until complete abrogation of any 
taxation. Much less has been done, however, 
with respect to governmental regulation of 
economic activity. Starting business, as reported 
by the World Bank, takes in average 32 days, 
and this number has remained constant for 
recent years (World Bank 2006). Corruption is 
estimated at a very high level, especially in the 
judiciary, i.e. in that body of the State that 
supposedly is responsible for the application of 
law. The practical implication of the improper 
functioning of the legal system is that a lawless 
state of arbitrary rules is created. Much has to be 
done in this direction by the future Bulgarian 
governments. 
One positive fact of the law on investments in 
Bulgaria is that no discrimination is made on the 
base of the nationality of the investor. However, 
a discrimination does exist according to the size 
                                                                         
Bulgarian government, concerns an oil refinery in northern 
Bulgaria, which was privatized in 1996, but was acquired 
by its current owners in 1998 after having gone bankrupt. 
In addition to previous controversies related to the legal 
ownership of the company, the current owners dispute the 
fact that the Environmental Protection Act voted by the 
Bulgarian Parliament in 2002 puts the entire liability on the 
company and absolves the Bulgarian government of any 
responsibility. For the moment, the case became notorious 
in international law for the difficulties it rose in 
determining whether the ICSID had jurisdiction over it or 
not. On the case, cf. International Institute for Sustainable 
Development (2005). 
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of the investment project. This discrimination 
should be abolished too, through an extension of 
the currently most favorable conditions to all 
investments, irrespective of their size. We 
suggest also that the more favorable regime of 
corporate income taxation should be extended to 
personal income taxation. Even though the 
economic nature of profit is indeed different 
from that of contractually determined revenues, 
there is no reason why the latter should be taxed 
more than the former. 
Also, the privatization of all infrastructures 
seems to be an immediate necessity. Investors 
need the guarantee that they can quickly and at a 
low cost ship their production and generally 
communicate with their partners and customers. 
The current condition of the state-owned 
infrastructure does not allow for this. Much 
more competition is needed in road building and 
exploitation, and in telecommunications. 
Finally, if FDIs are investments undertaken by 
non-residents, then investments in Bulgaria 
carried out by Bulgarian emigrants should be 
taken into account too. This remark, which may 
seem odd analytically, turns out to be 
statistically very important. Legal Bulgarian 
emigration abroad since 1989 amounts to some 
700 000 individuals, which is roughly 9 % of the 
total population. According to the United 
Nations, 100 000 Bulgarians leave the country 
every year (Dimitrova 2006). These emigrants 
are typically very much oriented toward saving 
an important part of their incomes. 
Systematically they send one part of these 
savings to their family members with the goal to 
sustain them, or in order to acquire real estate 
property in view of their future return in 
Bulgaria. The amounts sent back are quite 
considerable, as indicated by the following table. 
Table 5. Monetary flows from emigration (in million euros). 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Current Transfers 170,2 233,3 305,9 472,5 531,7 613 815,1 765,5 
Source: BNB (2006c) 
 
Recently, only a few weeks ago, the Bulgarian 
National Bank announced that a new, more 
correct, methodology of reporting current bank 
transfers from abroad accounts for additional 
818,4 million euros for the period 2001-2005 
(Standart Daily, 2006). Distributing this amount 
equally among the five years, the thus corrected 
data can then be easily compared to Greenfield 
or Expansion FDIs: 
Table 6. Monetary flows from emigration compared to FDI 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Private Current Transfers (in million Euros) 636,18 695,38 776,68 978,78 929,18
Greenfield and Expansion FDI (in million dollars)  793,7 839,7 1732,8 1667,3  
Source: BNB (2006c) 
 
It appears that the monetary flows from 
Bulgarian expatriates, for the period 2001-2004, 
are equivalent to three fourths of the amount of 
FDIs, at an exchange rate of 1,2 US dollars for 1 
euro. When it is recognized that much of the 
expatriates, especially if their stay abroad is 
illegal, do not use the services of financial 
institutions in order to transfer their savings, it 
appears that monetary flows from Bulgarians 
abroad into the Bulgarian economy are probably 
equal to FDIs.14 It is true that one part of the 
                                                 
14 The importance of current transfers from emigrants is 
even bigger if another, we believe necessary, adjustment is 
applied to the gross data. All contemporary banks are 
fractional-reserve banks. Any investment into a fractional-
savings thereby received is used for the purchase 
of consumption goods. However, much of the 
current transfers serve to acquire real-estate 
property and certainly contribute to explain the 
boom in the construction as well as in other 
industrial sectors. 
                                                                         
reserve bank is equivalent to the purchase of the right to 
open deposits financed by circulation credit based on thin 
air. If this is indeed an investment from the standpoint of 
the individual banker, there is no net investment, in terms 
of increased property, for the whole of the economy. It 
would not even be unreasonable to subtract these amounts 
from the gross investment, for due compensation of the 
expected damages in terms of misallocated real savings 
brought about by the operation of a fractional-reserve 
banking system. 
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It appears therefore that Bulgarian emigrants are 
another very important category of non-resident 
direct investment in the country. An immediate 
policy conclusion is that the Bulgarian 
government should secure their property in 
Bulgaria and increase as much as possible the 
incentives for non-resident Bulgarians to invest 
their savings into Bulgaria. A general tax cut of 
any kind of taxation seems to be the best 
measure in that direction. 
 
------------- 
The full list of literature and sources are 
availbale on IME webiste. 
 
 
 
 
On Competitiveness of Bulgarian Education * 
Svetla Kostadinova 
 
What is competitiveness? 
One of the most used definitions is that 
competitiveness is the ability of a country to 
achieve sustained high rates of growth in GDP 
per capita. A similar but more detailed 
definition, supplied by the OECD, is that 
competitiveness is the degree to which a nation 
can, under free trade and fair market conditions 
produce goods and services, which meet the test 
of international markets, while simultaneously 
maintaining and expanding the real incomes of 
its people over the long-term. 
 
Why is education important? 
For individuals, education and skills are the most 
important determinants of employment 
opportunities and income. Similarly, for any 
society overall, the skills and entrepreneurship 
of the human resources available to that society 
are the single most important factor in 
determining its economic output, growth and 
standards of living. 
Education is increasingly important to economic 
performance. It increases individual incomes, 
and an increase in a country’s average education 
level positively affects aggregate output. High 
levels of personal investment in education lead 
to a number of other personal and social 
benefits, including increased social inclusion, 
lower crime, reduced welfare dependence and 
better health. 
Having said that, we can easily examine 
Bulgarian education competitiveness by 
perceiving it as a good. In the text below, we 
will try to assess Bulgarian tertiary education in 
terms of competitiveness. 
Investment – education input  
The system of financing education is of great 
importance. Most countries allocate significant 
sources to education system. This has different 
effects depending on the efficiency of the system 
itself. 
 
Total public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP 
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Source: Eurostat 
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The data shows that Bulgarian state steadily 
increases funding for education but is still well 
below European average. Unfortunately, lack of 
money is not the problem. Increased funding in 
Bulgaria has not led to increased achievement. 
Over the past years, per pupil education 
spending has increased by more than 10% since 
1998, but students performance have seen no 
significant improvement. An international 
comparative assessment study, prepared by 
OECD puts Bulgaria on 32nd place for average 
reading literacy score with overall result of 430 
points whereas the average across countries is 
473. Countries like Czech Republic, Russian 
Federation, Thailand and Greece rank higher. 
The other consideration regarding the data is that 
Bulgarian population is decreasing for years, 
which is not the case for Europe. Therefore, we 
cannot justify the increase in public spending for 
education. On the other hand, the very system of 
financing of education is based on historical 
budgeting principle – the funds are calculated 
based on expenditures for the previous year, 
which are indexed according to total public 
revenues. This way, there are no incentives to 
improve financial performance since almost all 
expenditures will be financed. Another problem 
is that there is no equal treatment of state and 
private school and universities – the litter does 
not receive funds from the state and therefore 
there is no competitiveness element between the 
two systems.  
The only visible approach is introducing of 
voucher system in Bulgaria. This means that the 
money spent on education now will be in hands 
of students and they will decide which university 
to choose. This way, the best colleges and 
universities (both private and state) will receive 
more of the state funding and will have the 
resources to maintain and increase the quality. 
On the other side, those universities that exist 
only because of the current system will have 
three options – to increase the teaching quality, 
close or merge with other university. The reform 
will not be full if cuts in administration 
expenditures are not done. The staff of the 
Ministry of education is too much for the poor 
quality of the system that they maintain. 
Freedom of doing business – establishing of 
schools 
Article 9 of the Law on higher education in 
Bulgaria stipulates that the Parliament is 
responsible for establishment, restructuring, 
renaming and closing universities, as well as 
branches and departments. In other words, if 
someone (a company, group of parents, church 
or foreign university) wants to create a 
university (or branch) in the country, and be 
recognized, it would need Parliament approval. 
This requirement incredibly burdens the freedom 
of establishment and is a great impediment for 
competition within the country. Moreover, we 
should note that this requirement has nothing to 
do with state financing – it is not bounded by 
any means with state funding after approval. The 
only explanation given by lawmakers is that 
“state knows better”. 
Apart from this, different rules and regulations 
are cumbersome and detract universities from 
the primary task of educating students. The 
reasoning is that if taxpayers’ money is spent 
there should be tight control. The problem is that 
a great amount of resources – time and staff, is 
wasted on administration of the system without 
any significant positive effect. 
The role of the state should be to provide with 
clear rules on provision of information to 
interested parties – data on curriculum, 
expenses, timing, lecturers and educational 
approaches. The rest has be left to the judgment 
of consumers of their services. The 
professionalism, knowledge and reputation will 
serve as the best indicator for the quality and 
competitiveness of the university. 
Teachers’ pay and qualification 
Teachers’ salaries are always quoted as one of 
the major reasons why are they not stimulated to 
improve qualifications and commit strongly to 
teaching process. In Bulgaria, teachers are paid 
the average salary in the country. Their pay does 
not correspond to achievements of students, 
which is the main problem. In other words, the 
responsibility of teachers for students’ results 
does not exist. This does not stimulate quality 
and even if a state university is performing well 
it cannot attract more funding from the budget. 
All those in charge of the tertiary education, 
from professors to administrators, must be held 
accountable for their actions and decisions. 
Given the nature of institutions of higher 
education, those in power at universities operate 
with a certain degree of autonomy. Teachers are 
free to instruct in any given way that they might 
like, oftentimes neglecting the needs of their 
students, and instead giving quick, meaningless 
lectures and then return to their latest book or 
paper. Administrators, too, display sometimes 
astonishing lack of foresight when it comes to 
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running a school. They fail to manage resources 
appropriately, and do not establish sensible 
priorities. As a result, students end up graduating 
with a relatively low level of skills and are 
forced to take jobs that are less than meaningful. 
The solution is binding teachers’ pay to results 
that can happen by introducing voucher system. 
This way the money will follow the student and 
will be a reward for good done job. 
Quality – students’ employment prospects after 
graduation – education output 
The very nature of higher education is to provide 
with greater opportunities in the job market. If 
we examine the chances of one graduate in 
employment, we can assess the quality and 
added value of imputed efforts and funds. On the 
other hand, this is not one-way process – the 
labor market has to have the potential to 
“accept” the newcomers. According to many 
studies, the labor market in Bulgaria has 
potential for enlarging and EU accession will be 
additional factor for such development. Recent 
economic reforms (lowering the rate of social 
security contributions, privatization, etc.) create 
favorable environment for entrepreneurship 
where education and knowledge can help people 
in achieving success. 
 
 
Unemployment rates of the total population by level of education (population aged 25 to 59) 
% 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 Secondary education 
EU (25 countries) 8.0 7.6 8.0 8.2 8.4 8.1 
Bulgaria 13.8 17.3 15.9 11.2 10.2 8.1 
 Tertiary education 
EU (25 countries) 4.4 3.9 4.3 4.6 4.8 4.6 
Bulgaria 6.4 8 7.7 6.4 5.3 4 
Source: Eurostat 
 
The indicators show the "probability" of being 
without a job for those who would like to have 
one, broken-down by level of education. The 
indicators provide a measure of difficulties that 
people with different levels of education have to 
face in the labor market and offer a first idea of 
the impact of education in reducing the chances 
of being unemployed. 
Unfortunately, in Bulgaria the most of the 
university instruction is delivered in a manner as 
it was generations ago. There are many reasons 
for that but among most important are teachers’ 
pay that is not correlated to students knowledge, 
lack of direct participation of students in 
curriculum formation, continuous increase of 
state financing to universities that is not related 
to results, impossibility of establishing closer 
cooperation between the business and the 
university, etc. All these provide current students 
with a diploma that does not correspond strictly 
to knowledge. 
Relevance to reality - education does not go in 
line with economic changes 
Without a strong core curriculum, students lack 
the most basic knowledge about the world in 
which they live. Often, the elements of 
university curricula designed to acquaint 
students with the major areas of learning had 
become devalued and very irrelevant to business 
needs and expectations. On the other hand, great 
shares of students receive very specialized 
education that cannot be utilized for 
employment. The profile of the long-term 
unemployed in the country shows significant 
number of university people with specific 
knowledge. 
Bulgarian economy is still in a process of 
transition – the privatization is undergoing, the 
government is trying to stimulate economic 
activity and secure more friendly business 
environment. In this situation, we need 
entrepreneurs and resourceful people and 
universities should intermediate the process. Of 
course, this cannot happen without involvement 
of the business itself, which is already happening 
in Bulgaria. 
Bulgarians’ assessment of Bulgarian education 
According to Eurostat, the number of Bulgarian 
students enrolled aboard increases over the 
years. The figure is very tentative since some of 
the emigrants are just using this path to secure 
their stay in host country. Nevertheless, it clearly 
describes the trend of Bulgarians who can afford 
or receive scholarship to leave the country. This 
is by no means explicit indicator of the 
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preferences of some of consumers of Bulgarian 
education. In terms of competitiveness, this 
indicator shows that Bulgarian education is 
losing position and this process is unlikely to 
change if radical reform towards quality is not 
introduced. 
 
Mobility of students 
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Source: Eurostat 
 
Recent survey on universities’ quality 
worldwide done by Spanish council for higher 
education shows that only 3 Bulgarian 
universities are ranked – one state financed and 
two private. Sofia University is ranked on 1 291 
place, American University takes 2 570 place 
and New Bulgarian University is ranked 2 928th. 
The conclusion is obvious – full autonomy on 
curriculum, equality in financing through 
voucher system, privatization of state 
universities and business participation is the only 
way in achieving higher quality and 
competitiveness of education in Bulgaria. 
 
---------------------------- 
* Version of this article first appeared in Sofia Echo 
newspaper on May 25, 2006. 
 
 
 
 
ANNOUNCEMENT 
 
The Institute for Market Economics, based in 
Sofia, Bulgaria, is one of the most renown 
economic think-tanks in Eastern Europe. 
The mission of the IME is to develop and to 
advocate market-based solutions to the 
challenges that Bulgaria and other countries in 
the region face as they complete transition to the 
market economy and begin to take their place as 
modern nations with full-standing in the 
European Union. In this regard, the Institute 
works in a variety of ways to influence public 
opinion and policy making, to include consulting 
with government, providing liberal solutions to 
contemporary social and economic issues, and 
through education or other means to advance 
economic understanding and to disseminate 
economic knowledge. In pursuit of this goal, the 
IME is strictly independent from the influence of 
the government or any other vested interests. 
Presently, the Board of the Institute is seeking to 
appoint an Executive Director to lead the 
Institute during these critical early years of the 
21st Century. 
A long-standing transition plan provides that 
Krassen Stanchev, who founded the Institute in 
1993 and since has been its sole Director, will 
assume the position of Chairman. As a result, the 
Board of Directors is seeking a highly motivated 
individual to work with Krassen to continue the 
IME's 13-year record of distinguished 
performance. 
 
The ideal candidate would have experience in 
- Successfully managing a team of young, 
ambitious professionals; 
- Non-government, not-for-profit activity and/or 
public service; 
- International networking; 
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- Consulting and 
- Fund raising. 
 
The right person also would have: 
- An interest in successfully building and 
expanding the activity and reputation of the IME 
- A passion for liberal policy making; 
- Extensive knowledge of Bulgarian and 
European economic policy issues; 
- Training and understanding of 
macroeconomics, possibly evidenced by 
academic and/or media publications; 
- High energy and a strong but personable way 
with people; 
- An excellent reputation and impeccable 
integrity. 
Those interested should send a letter of interest, 
curriculum vitae and references to Martin 
Zaimov at martin.z@gmail.com 
 
 
 
 
